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This paper was originally presented at the ‘Marxism and Political Economy’ 
conference called by the International Socialist Journal on Saturday 29
th September 
2007. A revised version was presented to the Historical Materialism conference on 
13
th November 2007. It enquires why, although national economic equality is one of 
the most persistent features of the history of capitalism, economics as yet lacks a 
coherent economic explanation of it. It also enquires why Marxism has failed to 
develop such an explanation, and concludes that in both cases the inadequacies of 
existing theory arise from the constraints of the general equilibrium paradigm. In the 
second case, however, this paradigm is wrongly attributed to Marx.  
The paper argues that Marx’s own, original theory of value, contains the basis for an 
economic mechanism of divergence in the formation of market value as the average 
of many producers of differing productivities. The persistence of productivity 
differentials – excluded by the general equilibrium paradigm – is maintained by a 
positive feedback mechanism. It yields a surplus (above average) profit to the high 
productivity producers, who become geographically concentrated within a definite 
and very stable block of nation-states at an early point in the history of capitalism. 
From then on, this extra profit could be invested in maintaining a permanent 
productivity lead. This is an entirely temporal effect and cannot be predicted or 
reproduced if it is pre-supposed that productivity differentials are ignorable. 
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In this paper I want to explain two great problems about the world: Why orthodox 
economics has failed to understand world inequality, and why ‘Marxist’ economics 
has also failed. 
You will notice that I did not say ‘explain world inequality’, but ‘why existing 
theories fail to explain it’. Actually, world inequality is easy to explain: it’s the 
capitalist system, dummy. To understand how it produces world inequality, one needs 
a theory. It’s not even difficult to produce a theory, and I will offer an obvious one by 
showing how Marx’s conception of individual and social value explains world 
inequality. But that isn’t, I think, the problem we face: what we should really ask is 
why economics fails to find such an obvious explanation. This isn’t, I think, because 
the economists are stupid or lack ‘facts’. It is because their theory makes it 
impossible. 
This theory is the dogma of equilibrium, which dominates mainstream economics and 
was foisted on Marx by the Marxists, robbing it of all its explanatory capabilities. 
Market breakdown 
World inequality is only one of several empirically obvious phenomena that remained 
unexplained, which I call ‘market breakdown’. These include 
(1) long phases of declining average profit rates and slow growth, one of which 
we are still in now 
(2) regular, cyclic crisis, which is back on everybody’s lips at the moment. 
Market breakdown is not the same as the ‘market failure’, the words economists use 
as an excuse for when things go wrong. This says that the market has not been 
allowed to work properly. For the equilibrium economist the market is never to 
blame. It is the fault of trade unions, bad governance, poor monetary policies, 
overregulation (or newly popular, underregulation), terrorism, historical 
backwardness, Islam, Communism – you name it, they blame it. 
Market breakdown is a failure which the market does all by itself. Marx himself used 
a similar idea in talking about the falling rate of profit. Bourgeois economists, he said, 
hate this idea because it suggests capitalism contains internal limits, creating 
contradictions that sow the seed of its own destruction. 
To avoid such conclusions, economics has been shaped over the years into a refined 
tool for denying that market breakdown is possible, and in the shape of equilibrium it 
has found the perfect Orwellian theory – it is a theory from which market breakdown 
cannot logically be deduced.  
It is in a state of psychotic denial – it has fashioned a theory that cannot recognise the 
capitalist causes of its own problems out of pathological terror of admitting them. 
Equilibrium begins by assuming the market reproduces itself perfectly. Even when 
change is permitted, as in the theory of growth, we find this has to take place in 
unchanging proportions, which is simply another kind of perfect reproduction. 
This does not mean the economist assume that change never happens: what happens is 
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never understand any capitalist failure which capitalism does to itself. 
The irony of ironies is that Marx’s own value theory, which starts from a total and 
violent rejection of equilibrium, has been changed – re-interpreted – into an 
equilibrium theory. This started with von Bortkiewicz , was endorsed by the 
prominent American Marxist Paul Sweezy, and finally, in the hands of the followers 
of Piero Sraffa, converted it into an instrument for ruling Marx’s own ideas out of 
court, on the utterly false grounds that they are internally inconsistent. The 
inconsistency, as Andrew Kliman, myself and others persistently explain, arises 
simply and only from imposing on Marx an economic theory he never held. 
It is easy to explain market breakdown, once one departs from the dogma of 
equilibrium. It is impossible to explain it otherwise. That is why neither mainstream, 
nor ‘Marxist’ economics has been able to explain it, and is vital to detach Marx’s 
own, non-equilibrium ideas from the dead hand of this dogma. 
The ‘classical’ tradition offers no explanation 
The first thing to establish is easy, because it is widely admitted: the mainstream 
economic tradition offers no explanation of the growing inequality of nations and  
confidently predicts it should not happen. For Adam Smith in the ‘wealth of nations’, 
trade is what causes wealth. For Ricardo, the theory of comparative advantage – still 
trotted out as the basis for IMF policies, while Marx is derided as ‘out of date’ – 
predicts that provided nations specialise appropriately, the outcome of trade will be 
optimum. In no classical writing do we find the slightest inkling that trade under fully 
capitalist conditions can create or increase, rather than decreasing, national 
differences. 
There has been no improvement. The famous Samuelson factor-price theorem, 
starting point of nearly every textbook on international trade, ‘proves’ an 
embarrassing conclusion: in a developed capitalist market, even in the presence of 
national boundaries, the ‘price of factors’ should equalise. Profits and wages should 
over time become the same the world over. 
Samuelson logically proves that, under equilibrium assumptions, an unconstrained 
capitalist market cannot produce any other outcome. If one accepts this theory, 
therefore, the only possible answer of inequality is a failure of the peoples thus 
impoverished. The victims are to blame for their own subjection – the foundation of 
modern racism and the all-pervasive idea of ‘backwardness’. 
Economics meets the economy: Is backwardness a historical 
phenomenon? 
These predictions simply have not happened. A well-established literature agrees that 
the ‘great divide’ has got worse, the more developed is world capitalism. The 
theoretical question is then simple: since world poverty and divergence are clearly 
produced by capitalism, why is there no theory to explain how capitalism does it? 
To illustrate this I constructed a simple indicator of world inequality. Taking the 
IMF’s own classifications, I calculated the output (GDP) of the whole so-called 
‘advanced’ world and the whole of ‘rest’. Dividing this by population yields output 
per person – a reasonable proxy for output per worker – of these two great parts of the 
world. Dividing one by the other gives us a measure of world inequality. 
What emerges is that poverty under ‘globalisation’ nearly doubled between 1980 and 2007e ISJ Explaining National Inequality;2.docPage 4 of 6  20/01/2008 00:00 
2000. In 1980, the rich one-fifth of the world was  on average 12 times richer per head 
than the poor four-fifths. By 2000, this had risen to 22 times. 
A number of other things emerge. The first is the extraordinary geographical stability 
of the ‘rich’ world. Since the time Lenin, territories that have escaped ‘backwardness’ 
contain at most 80 million people = 2% of population of the ‘backward’ world. 
The second is that the persistence of polarisation is a secular trend. Unlike the decline 
in the profit rate, it is essentially never reversed. It may go quicker or slower, or 
reverse for a short while. But over virtually any ten-year period, it always gets worse. 
The third point is that polarisation is extreme. In 1907 according to Pritchett, the ratio 
of the poorest to the richest country in GDM per capital was 7 times. By 1997 it was 
132 times. The inequality ratio for the whole world is now three times greater than the 
gap between the poorest and richest countries in 1907. The ratio of GDP per capita of 
the rich countries to that of key, large countries such as India is now of the order of 
40:1. To put this another way, the output of one worker in the rich countries 
exchanges against the output of forty Indian workers. 
Crap by any other name 
What is most interesting is that the same thing has gone by so many different names. 
In the 19th C rich and poor countries were called ‘Civilised and Barbarous’; in the 
early 29
th, Imperialist and Colonial and semi-colonial; from the forties onwards, 
developed and underdeveloped, after Mao’s speech the first and the third world. Then 
in the 1970s we had dominant and dependent, then North and South, in the IMF’s 
language advanced and non-advanced and now guess what? With Huntingdon’s 
‘Clash of civilisations’ we are back to Civilised and Barbarous. When the same object 
is called by so many different names this tells us two things: one, it is mighty 
persistent, and two, people are trying to avoid it. 
The dogma of equilibrium 
Why cannot equilibrium theory explain this? Because equilibrium assumes that all 
differences have been eliminated. You have to assume that the average technique for 
making every product is the single, actual technique. That means you rule out finding 
low and high productivity producers in the same market. The deduction flows from 
this theory : it is a theoretical consequence of it, and if you want to deduce another 
conclusion, you either have to use another theory, or you have to find something non-
economic to explain it.  
Is there an economic mechanism of backwardness? 
How does this differ from what Marx himself says, and how, therefore, does Marx’s 
theory make it possible to explain national differences in income? 
First, Marx never states that profit rates actually equalise. To the contrary, differences 
in profit rates or surplus profits are the  motor of capitalist dynamics. He sets out 
where these differences arise, in chapter 8 of volume III and in the unpublished 
‘Chapter 6’ of Volume I otherwise known as the Resultate, which is published in the 
Penguin edition of this work.  
Marx explains that in his view, value is never identical between producers but is an 
average of the use-values produced, divided by the labour expended by the global 
labourer. Many producers, with many productivities, coexist at any time. Since they 2007e ISJ Explaining National Inequality;2.docPage 5 of 6  20/01/2008 00:00 
all sell their product for a single price, the most productive – the ones with the lowest 
costs – make more profit, or to put it in value terms, value that is produced by the less 
productive is appropriated by the more productive. 
Of course, this is in continuous motion. As average productivity rises, producers exit, 
bankrupt or dead, from the bottom, and new, more productive ones come in at the top. 
The point, is that this does not abolish the differential profit, as equilibrium theory 
must suppose. As fast as poor producers leave, more rich producers arrive, just like a 
waterfall which plunges into a chasm but is continuously filled from upstream, 
Moreover, these differential profits become concentrated because there is a ‘positive 
feedback’ mechanism. It concentrates geographically. Since the producers in the 
high-productivity countries are making higher profits, they plough them back into 
innovation and keep their lead. In the low productivity countries, the only way to 
compete is to cut wages – which is what happens. The exchange rate drifts downward, 
expressing the fact that the labour of 10, 20 and 40 workers in a low productivity 
country is exchanged by the market against the labour of 1 worker in the high 
productivity countries. On the one hand, therefore, the price of domestic products falls 
leading to rising ‘purchasing power parity’. But this does not deal with the 
fundamental problem of growth. To the contrary, the price of technology which is a 
quasi-monopoly of the high productivity countries, in effect costs 10, 20, 40 times 
more than what the labour of the poor country can contribute in order to obtain it. 
Market or state? 
What does this tell us, in conclusion, about the present state of the world? At this 
point I will refer to some of Marx’s decisive and relevant political conclusions, 
concerning the role of the state and its relation to the market.  
Mainstream social theory has an ambiguous relation to the state in the world 
economy. The sociologists want to say that globalisation has hollowed out the state 
which has ceased to matter. But the economists want to put the blame for the market’s 
own breakdowns somewhere else, so it tells us that bad or rogue states are 
responsible. This leads to the odd conclusion that a hollowed-out rogue state can 
plunge the world into nuclear war. 
Actually, the state has a clear relation both to the national and to the world market, 
which is that it creates the conditions for their existence. What it has given, it can also 
take away. The market is there due to the grace of the state, a grace sometimes rudely 
enforced. 
The state also overrides, within its own territory, contradictions that threaten capitalist 
power. It regulates social conflict and finds ways to override, at least partially, the 
extreme regional differences which characterise relations between nations. 
The state is also the ‘executive committee of the bourgeoisie’ and enforces and 
advances its national interests. It can therefore override or reenforce and exploit the 
world market, and loses no opportunity to do so. 
The executive committee of the world bourgeoisie, which in 1972  was, by delegated 
authority, the USA, took at that time a vital decision which has driven its growth ever 
since, to place US interests above world interests including those of its rivals. My 
view, shared with my collaborator Radhika Desai, is that ‘globalisation’ was 
essentially a working out of this, a  political imposition of the USA to force the world 
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Two things are happening now. The first is that this has decisively slowed down the 
growth of its economic rivals, Europe and Japan. The US lead in ‘world growth’ in 
2002  was not because it had taken off but because everyone else slowed down to a 
dead crawl. 
Total growth of GDP per capita 
(per cent over the decade)  1970-80 1980-90  1990-2000
North America  24.6 24.8  20.9
Euro Area  122.0 25.4  -8.4
South-East Asia  128.9 68.1  19.9
Rest of the world  35.4 -19.8  -14.5
 
Second, it hasn’t worked,  in two senses. First, it has created a crisis of governance in 
the states of the Third World. So-called ‘rogue states’ are simply territories where the 
economic policies cravenly imposed during the time when the IMF wrote them on 
behalf of local people, have lost the support of the people, so that no government that 
supports IMF polcies – that is, those dictated by the USA – can stay in power. 
Second, it hasn’t solved the problems of the USA. Its debt, at 8% of GDP, has become 
so unmanageable that it has provoked an crisis in the financial system that can be 
‘resolved’ by only one of two means, which is to take it out of the pockets of the US 
consumer, or to take it out of the pockets of the world’s poor. But the political 
processes which make the second possible have reached their utmost limit, which is 
why we see Giuliani running on a platform of nuking Iran, and the Neocons grimly 
hanging on to start the war before the election. 
To add: imperialism; the role of the state as coordinator of gains from superprofits; 
the division of labour between the imperialist powers as to specialisation (US 
financial and commercial with UK junior partner, Germany-Japan technical). 
Breakdown of hegemony with decline of US domination of technical superprofit 
>1967, tipping point as no longer hegemonic organiser of financial superprofit. 
Military advantures the only US ruling class recourse against internal highly 
accelerated class conflict 
 
 